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HERBERT W. HARRIMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 
JACK TETIK et al., Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Escrows - Liability of Depositary. - Under an escrow agree-
ment stating that the purchaser of a liquor business would 
pay into escrow the full purchase price, providing for transfer 
of fixtures and the liquor license, and expressly stating that the 
escrow agent "shall not be held liable or responsible for • . . 
distribution [from the money on deposit] prior to the close of 
escrow," the escrow agent's payments out of escrow to the 
seller and his creditors before the sale date were not in breach 
of the escrow agreement, and Bus. & Prof. Code, § 24074, re-
lating to establishment of escrow on transfer of a liquor license, 
imposed no obligation on the escrow agent. The evidence 
supported a finding that the quoted words embodied the in-
tention of the parties where the sellcr testified that the pur-
chaser accompanied him on the two occasions he received 
disbursements from the escrow agent, and apparently the 
purchaser made no objection either time. 
[2] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-Mixed 
questions of law and fact may not be raised for the first time 
on appeal; to allow them would disrupt the orderly administra-
tion of justice. 
[3] Contracts-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether a contract 
has been cancelled, rescinded or abandoned is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact which is addressed to the trial court. 
[4] Id.-Rescission-By Mutual Consent.-Mutual rescission in-
volves the formation of a new contract, and the issues include 
the same questions of law and fact regarding offer and ac-
ceptance that occur in any other problem of contract formation. 
[5] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-Whether 
defendant's sale of the liquor license of his cocktail lounge to 
his attorney constituted an acceptance of plaintiff's offer to 
rescind a contract of sale of the liquor business to plaintiff 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Escrows, § 12 et seq.; Am.Jur., Escrows, § 17 
et seq. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, §§ 189, 190; Am.Jur., Contracts, 
§ 431. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Escrows, § 15; [2] Appeal and Error, 
§ 119; [3] Contracts, § 278; [4] Contracts, § 196; [5] Appeal and 
Error, § 120; [6] Trial, § 310; [7] Restitution and Unjust En-
richment, § 1; [8] Contracts, § 76(1); [9-11] Intoxicating Liquors, 
§ 9.8. 
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was a mixed question of law and fact thnt should have been 
presented to the trial court; such question lllay not be raised 
for the first time on appeal. 
[6] Trial-Findings-Time of Signing.-Code Civ. Proc., § 634, 
relating to the time of signing findings, is merely directory, 
not mandatory. 
[7] Restitution and Unjust Enrichment - Applicability of Prin-
ciple.-The principle that even a willfully defaulting pur-
chaser of real property can recover the consideration paid to 
the extent that it exceeds the seller's damages extends beyond 
real estate transactions and applies in a variety of situations 
to avoid unjust enrichment. 
r8] Contracts-Legality-Effect of Dlega.lity.-The general rule, 
subject to a wide range of exceptions, is that parties to an 
illegal agreement cannot seek the aid of the courts on a breach 
of contract. 
[9] Intoxicating Liquors-Licenses-Transfer.-Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 24073, relating to notice of an intended transfer of a retail 
liquor license, neither declares transfers of licenses to be 
against public policy nor expressly voids contracts specifying 
payments of consideration before application for a license is 
made. The injunction "No ••• license .•. shall be transferred" 
is not directed at the buyer and seller; the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control, Dot the parties, transfers licenses; 
the parties, denominated the "licensee" and "intended trans-
feree" merely apply to the department for a transfer. (Bus. 
& Prof. Code, §§ 24070-24074.) 
[10] Id.-Licenses-Transfer.-Where the seller of a liquor license 
discussed the delay in applying for a transfer of the liquor 
license with a representative of the Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control who stated that "there is nothing in par-
ticular about it, no big rush," and the seller promised only to 
take the necessary steps to have the department transfer the 
license, and where the entire sale was made conditional on the 
department's willingness to do so, by failing in good faith to 
provide for the prescribed time for payment in their contract 
of sale, the parties merely failed to comply with a condition 
that had to be satisfied before the department could make the 
transfer, and, on the department's failure to make the transfer, 
there was no reason to deny restitution to the buyer of any 
·part of the consideration paid. 
[11] Id.-Licenses-Transfer.-Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 24073, 24074, 
relating to notice of an intended transfer of a retail liquor 
license and to establishment of an escrow on such transfer, 
protect the interests of creditors of the seller of the liquor 
[9] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Alcoholic Beverages, § 32. 
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business by allowing them to satisfy their claim out of the 
purchase price, and protect the buyer from loss of his con-
sideration if the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 
does not transfer the license to him. The statutory purpose to 
protect creditors was accomplished by a provision in the sale 
. agreement that they could be paid from funds in escrow; its 
purpose to protect the buyer would be defeated if, on failure 
of the department to transfer the license to him and the seller's 
subsequent sale of the license to his attorney, the buyer could 
not recover the seller's unjust enrichment resulting from the 
payments received. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part with directions. 
Action by buyer under a contract for sale of a half interest 
in a cocktail lounge against seller for rescission and restitu-
tion of consideration paid and against the escrow holder for 
return of money remaining in escrow and to hold it liable for 
money paid to seller and bis creditors. Judgment for defend-
ant escrow holder affirmed; jUdgment for defendant seller 
reversed with directions insofar as it denied plaintiff restitu-
tion of any part of consideration paid, and affirmed in all 
other respects. 
Crooks and Gunter and John E. Crooks for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Karl K. Ransom and Toshiro Hiraide for Defendant and 
Respondent Tetik. 
Irving D. Friedman for Defendant and Respondent Cal-
state Escrow Service, Inc. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On October 19, 1958 plaintiff agreed to 
buy a half interest in defendant Tetik's cocktail lounge, the 
"Fancy Free." Tetik had listed the entire business for sale, 
and the parties contemplated sale of the remaining half when 
plaintiff had learned the business and raised the capital. They 
agreed to operate the business as a partnership in the mean-
time. The contract, drawn as an escrow agreement on a form 
provided by defendant Calstate Escrow Service, stated that 
Harriman would pay into escrow the full price of $9,500. He 
also promised to pay directly to Tetik half the value of the 
) 
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liquor on hand as well as half the amount Tetik had previously 
paid for a deposit on the lease. The $9,500 was allocated by 
the parties: $3,000 for fixtures and equipment, $3,500 for 
the leasehold interest, and $3,000 for the liquor iicense. Tetik 
promised to place in escrow a bill of sale to the property along 
with notices of intended transfer of the license and of sale of 
stock in bulk. He promised also to apply for transfer of the 
license, to assign the lease, and to deliver the bill of sale. 
Transfer of the license by the Department of Alcoholic Bever-
age Control was made a condition of the sale. A general clause 
provided that if the seller should "for any reason whatsoever 
. . . fail, refuse, or be unable to deliver subject business as 
per these instructions ... " all payments received by the seller 
would be returned. 
Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff paid the entire pur-
chase price into escrow and paid an additional $3,459 directly 
to Tetik. On the following November 4th, apparently under-
stood as the date of sale, the parties began joint operation of 
the business. Thereafter, the escrow agent, following the 
instructions, paid to Tetik or to his creditors, $6,740.09, re-
tained certain fees for itself, and left $2,322.91 in the escrow 
account. 
Although the business ,vas operated as a partnership for 
approximately three months, with each party assuming man-
agerial functions and handling the finances, no formal transfer 
was ever made of the lease, the license, or of the fixtures and 
equipment. Formal transfer was postponed until plaintiff 
decided whether to purchase the remainder of the business. 
On February 9, 1959, plaintiff served Tetik with a "Notice 
of Rescission" of the contract for alleged "fraud" and "fail-
ure of consideration." . Immediately thereafter, he filed an 
action against Tetik for rescission and for restitution of the 
consideration paid. Plaintiff joined Calstate Escrow Service 
as a defendant seeking return of the money remaining in 
escrow and to hold Calstate liable for the money it had paid 
to Tetik and his creditors. Plaintiff then attached the tavern 
fixtures. A considerable amount of the liquor was removed 
from the premises before the sheriff could attach it. Tetik 
attempted to carryon the business with his own funds, but 
,vas able to do so for only two weeks, since the sheriff removed 
the fixtures. The lease was allowed to lapse, and the business . 
came to an end. Tetik then conveyed the liquor license to his 
nttorney, keeping the entire proceeds from the sale. i 
The court, sitting without a jury, found no fraud by Tetik . 
) 
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and entered judgment in his favor.1 Plaintiff, however, was 
allowed recovery from Cal state of the amount still in escrow 
less $325 for attorney fees and costs, but was denied recovery 
of the money Calstate had paid out .. The court did not award 
plaintiff any of the business' assets, and the judgment left 
him with only $1,977.91 of the $12,959 he had paid. Tetik had 
received from plaintiff $10,199.09, almost the full price of 
one-half of the business, and retained the fixtures, the accumu-
lated earnings, and the entire proceeds from the sale of the 
license. 
Plaintiff appeals. [1] He contends that Calstate is liable 
to him for $6,740.09 paid out of escrow before the sale date 
allegedly in "breach of statutory duty" imposed by Business 
and Professions Code section 24074 and in violation of the 
escrow agreement. Section 24074, however, imposes no obliga-
tion on the escrow agent, and the trial court correctly con-
strued the agreement in holding that Calstate's payments to 
Tetik and to his creditors were not in breach of the escrow 
agreement. In addition to the usual printed exculpatory 
clauses purporting to relieve the escrow agent of liability, the 
agreement included a typed paragraph stating that Calstate 
"shall not be held liable or responsible for said distribution 
prior to the close of escrow." The record supports the trial 
court's conclusion that the quoted words embodied the inten-
tion of the parties and that both of them understood that the 
money was to bc paid out of escrow at the time it was in fact 
paid.2 Tetik testified that Harriman accompanied him on the 
two occasions he received the disbursements from Calstate. 
'The court, accepting Tetik's suggested findings of fact in foto, found 
that the allegations of his cross-complaint against Harriman for damages 
were false. 
'On cross-examination Tetik testified: 
"Q. Who dictated the instructions that you were to be paid .6,000 
from the escrow fund' A. I had that understanding with Mr. Harriman 
and Creveling [a broker] and Mr. Creveling dictated it. 
". .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . 
"Q. And when you told Mr. Harriman this did you tell him when 
you would want that money' A. Yes. 
"Q. How did you say it! A. I Baid I wanted it as Boon as I could 
get it. 
"Q. Did you tell him whether you would have to have it before the 
close of escrow' A. Well, there was not even any mention of 'close of 
escrow' in it. It was stated by Mr. Creveling that I could take the 
money out and agreed to by Mr. Harriman that I could take the money 
fi ... e days after a notice of intention to sell was passed and recorded." 
Harriman stated on cross-examination: 
"Q. All right, 1 mean specifically as to this $6,000, tell the Court 
what you remember today of what was said on that day. A. I do not 
) 
) 
810 lIAmuMAN v. TETIX [56C.2d 
Apparently Harriman made no objection either time. The 
trial court was therefore justified in concluding that "As to 
the Escrow Company, plaintiff agreed to all steps of the 
escrmv and cannot hold Escrow Company liable." 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in failing to 
find a mutual rescission of the contract on the ground that 
Tetik ratified the attempted rescission by selling the license. 
Although he did not raise this issue in the trial court, plain-
tiff urges that under Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal2d 736 [336 
P.2d 534], he may raise it on appeal In the Ward case, how-
ever, the new theory involved solely a question of law. (Ward 
v. Ta·ggart, supra, at p. 742; see Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal. 
2d 337, 341 [303 P.2d 738].) [2] To allow mixed ques-
tions of law and fact to be raised on appeal for the first time 
would disrupt the orderly administration of justice. (See 
Caplan v. Schroeder, ante, pp. 515, 521 [15 CalRptr. 145, 
364 P.2d 321] ; Panopulos v. Maderis, supra, at pp. 340-341; 
64 Harv.L.Rev. 652.) [3] "The question of whether a 
contract has been cancelled, rescinded or abandoned is a mixed 
question of law and fact .•. which is addressed. to the trial 
court .... " (Ross v. Frank W. Dunne Co., 119 Cal,App.2d 
690,698 [260 P.2d 104] ; see Hagen v. Sherman, 147 Cal.App, 
2d 28, 30-31 [304 P,2d. 767].) [4] Mutual reseission in-
volves the formation of a new contract, and the issues include 
the same questions of law and fact regarding offer and ac-
ceptance that occur in any other problem of contract forma-
tion. (See 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1236, pp. 956-957.) 
[ 5 ] Whether in the instant case Tetik's sale of the license 
constituted an acceptance of an offer to rescind was a mixed 
question of law and fact that should have been presented to 
the trial court. 
[ 6 ] Plaintiff also contends that the judgment cannot be 
sustained, on the ground that in violation of section 634 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure the trial court signed Tetik's 
suggested findings of fact within two days after they were 
submitted, thereafter refusing to consider plaintiff's suggested 
findings. Section 634, however, "has on numerous occasions 
bE'en held to be merely directory and not mandatory." (Treat 
v. Superior Court, 7 Ca1.2d 636, 639 [62 P.2d 147] ; Noland 
v. Noland, 44 Cal.App.2d 780, 784 [113 P,2d 11] ; see Pruyn 
remember who made tile original request that $6,000 be released for 
Mr. Tetik, whether it was Mr. Tetilt or Mr. Creveling. 
"Q. Can you remember agreeing that that should be a provision in 
tll(' escrow agreement ~ A. lean rem('mber that prior to signing any 
\ papers." 
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v. Waterman, 172 Cal.App.2d 133, 141 [342 P.2d 87].) The 
trial court's action did not constitute reversible error. 
[7] Plaintiff next contends that the judgment worked a 
forfeiture contrary to the rule of Freedman v. Rector, 
Wardens &- V. of St. Matthias Parish, 37 Ca1.2d 16 [230 P.2d 
"629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1]. We there held that even a willfully 
defaulting purchaser of real property could recover con-
sideration paid to the extent he could show that it exceeded 
the seller's damages. That principle extends beyond real estate 
transactions and applies in a variety of situations to avoid 
unjust enrichment. (See e.g., Bird v. Kenworthy, 43 Ca1.2d 
656 [277 P.2d 1] ; Begovich v. Murphy, 359 Mich. 156 [101 
N.W.2d 278].) Although plaintiff grounded his claim for 
restitution on fraud, the facts pleaded and proved, his demand 
for relief, and the issues stated in the pretrial order entitlerl 
him to restitution. So far as the record indicates, Tetik's 
only loss was of the leasehold interest. 
It is contended, however, that plaintiff is not entitled to 
restitution on the ground that the contract was illegal. Section 
24073 of the Business and Professions Code provides: 
"No retail license limited in numbers shall be transferred 
unless before the filing of the transfer application with thc 
department the licensee or the intended transferee records in 
the office of the county recorder of the eounty or counties in 
which the premises to which the license has been issued are 
situated a notice of the intended transfer, stating all of the 
following: 
" 
«« (e) An agreement between the parties to the transfer 
that the consideration for the transfer of the business and 
license or licenses, if any there be, is to be paid only aftcr 
the transfer is approved by the department [of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control)." The contract did not provide for pay-
ment only after the state had granted the application for 
transfer of the license, and the consideration was paid out 
of escrow immediately. 
[8] The general rule, subject to a wide range of excep-
tions, is that parties to an illegal agreement cannot seek the 
aid of the courts upon a breach of contract. (See Lewis cf; 
Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons, 48 Ca1.2d 141, 150 [308 P.2d 713] : 
Miller v. California Roofi11g Co., 55 Cnl.App.2d 136, 14] 
[130 P.2d 740] ; Hcstntement of Contracts, § 598.) [9] The 
contract herein, however, was not illegal, and no considerations 
of public policy require tl'l'ating it as such. Business and 
) 
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Professions Code section 24073 neither declares transfers of 
licenses to be against public policy nor expressly voids con-
tracts specifying payments of consideration before applica-
tion for a license transfer is made. The injunction "No ... 
license . . . shall be transferred . . ." is not directed at the 
buyer and the seller. The Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control, not the parties, transfers licenses. The parties, de-
nominated the "licensee" and the "intended transferee" 
merely apply to the department for a transfer. (Bus. & Prof . 
. Code, §§ 24070-24074; see Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Appeals Board, 52 Ca1.2d 259, 261-262, 264 [341 P.2d 
291] ; Ri.shwain v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 
162 Cal.App.2d 207 [328 P.2d 473].) Realizing this, the 
parties did not purport to transfer the license themselves. 
[10] Tetik discussed the delay in applying for a transfer 
with a representative of the department who, in Tetik's words, 
stated that "there is nothing in particular about it, no big 
rush." Tetik promised only to take the necessary steps to have 
the department transfer the license, and the entire sale was 
made conditional on the department's willingness to do so. 
By failing in good faith to provide for the prescribed time 
for payment in their contract, the parties merely failed to 
comply with a condition that had to be satisfied before the 
department could make the transfer. Under these circum-
stances, there is no reason to deny restitution. (See generally, 
Grodecki, 111 Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis, 
71 L.Q.Rev. 254; Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired 
Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U.Pa.L.Rev. 261.) 
[11] Sections 24073 and 24074 of the Business and 
Professions Code protect the interests of creditors of the 
seller by allowing them to satisfy their claims out of the 
purchase price. They also protect the buyer from loss of his 
consideration if the department does not transfer the license 
to him. In this case, the creditors of Tetik were fully pro-
tected by a provision in the agreement that the creditors could 
be paid from funds in escrow. Thus the statutory purpose to 
protect creditors was accomplished, and its purpose to protect 
the buyer would be defeated if he could not recover the 
seller's unjust enrichment. 
The judgment as to defendant Calstate is affirmed. The 
judgment is reversed insofar as it denies plaintiff restitution 
of any part of the consideration paid, and the trial court is 
directed to retry the issue of the amount thereof to which be 
is entitled. In aU other respects the judgment is affirmed. 
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Defendant Calstate is awarded its costs on this appeal. Plain-
tiff and defendant Tetik are to bear their own costs on this 
appeal. 
.Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., llcComb, J. t Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 26396. In Bank. Nov. 16, 1961.] 
EDWARD LOUIS MALENGO, JR., Petitioner, v. THE 
MUNICIPAL COURT FOR THE EAST LOS AN-
GELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY et aI., Respondents j THE PEOPLE, Real 
Party in Interest. 
[1] Criminal Law - Time of Trial- Continuances.-Under Pen. 
Code, § 1382, subd. 3, as amended in 1959, providing for dis-
missal of an action when defendant in a misdemeanor case ie: 
not brought to trial within 30 days after he is arrested and 
brought within the jurisdiction of the court "except that an 
action shall not be dismissed" if it is set for trial on a date 
beyond the 30-day period at defendant's request or with his 
consent, express or implied, and if defendant is brought to 
trial on the day so set for trial or within 10 days thereafter, 
the court did not abuse its discretion, after a date was fixed 
for trial beyond the statutory 30-day period, in granting the 
People's motion for a one-week continuance in the absence of 
a showing that defendant could not have appeared for trial 
within ten days after the date fixed or even within the seven 
days requested by the People. Under such circumstances de-
fendant could not choose a later trial date, to which the trial 
was in fact continued, and then complain that he was not 
brought to trial within the time prescribed by law j he must be 
deemed to have waived any objection to thecontinuaJice to the 
date thus chosen by him. 
[2] Id.-Time of Trial-Continuances.-Pen. Code, § 1050, pro-
viding that "no continuance of a criminal trial shall be granted 
except upon affirmative proof in open court, upon reasonable 
notice, that the ends of justice require a continuance" is 
directory only, not mandatory; it contains no provision for the 
dismissal of a case when its terms are not complied with. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Continuance, § 4 et seq. j Am.Jur., Trial, 
§ 14 et seq. 
Kelt. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 250. 
